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Urban Renewal After the 1974 Housing
Act
JOHN E. MOGK* AND GEORGE J. MAGER, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal urban renewal program was established by the
National Housing Act of 1949.1 The Act set a national housing
goal of providing "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family."2 Twenty-five years later the nation is
still struggling to show substantial progress toward fulfilling this
commitment.
Urban renewal was conceived primarily as a categorical funding
program to aid local municipalities in eliminating substandard
housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas. From
the outset, the program exhibited numerous deficiencies resulting
from local bureaucratic constraints and compounded by federal reg-
ulations and practices adopted to govern the local use of urban
renewal funds. Project planning, initially required before any work
could begin, routinely dragged on for years. Funding levels were
consistently set too low to produce meaningful results early in the
project. Relocation assistance payments, until the passage of a relo-
cation assistance program,3 were woefully inadequate. Some local
units of government used the program to eliminate blacks and other
minorities from their communities with federal involvement or ac-
quiescence.4 Measuring these developments against the expecta-
tions envisioned for the program reveals the obvious failure of the
federal urban renewal effort. As the conditions in America's cities
became worse and civil disturbances erupted in the early and mid-
1960's, antagonism surfaced between local and federal officials with
respect to the shortcomings of the urban renewal program, each
blaming the other for ineffective performance.
I. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
It was due to these circumstances that Congress, in 1974, re-
* B.B.A. 1961, University of Michigan; J.D. 1964, University of Michigan; Diploma of
Comparative Law 1965, University of Stockholm; Professor, Wayne State University Law
School. Member, State Bars of New York and Michigan.
** Associate, Hammond, Ziegelman & Sotiroff. B.A. 1971, University of Michigan; J.D.
1974, Wayne State University; Member, State Bar of Michigan.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (1970).
4. Cf. Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, in URBAN RENEwAL 491 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
See generally URBAN RENEWAL (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
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structured its approach for providing communities with financial
assistance for redevelopment. The urban renewal program was
amended by the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974.1 For the purposes of this Symposium, the Act will not be
discussed in depth.
Briefly, the Act eliminates urban renewal and a number of
other categorical community development programs including
Open Space, Urban Beautification, Historic Preservation, Public
Facility Loans, Water and Sewer Neighborhood Facilities Grants,
Model Cities Supplemental Grants, and Rehabilitation Loans. In
their place, there is provision for block grants to municipalities for
locally determined community development projects selected from
a general list of eligible activities such as acquisition, improvement
and disposition of real property, code enforcement, property demoli-
tion, historic preservation, public works and open space. Generally
these activities cover the same areas as the old categorical grant
program.
The effect of the Act is to remove federal officials from the
decisionmaking and supervisory roles they have historically played
in local projects. The activities of condemnation, demolition,
clearance, and resale of sites within blighted areas, initiated by
municipalities under the original federal urban renewal approach,
will undoubtedly be continued, though funding will no longer be
provided through categorical programs. Most local governments can
be expected to attempt to complete existing projects using com-
munity development block grant funds.
Although federal participation in urban redevelopment has
been substantially altered, traditional legal issues involved in as-
sembling redevelopment parcels remain unchanged. A review of re-
cent significant cases in this area follows.
III. PROPER PUBLIC PURPOSE
Municipalities may take private property in furtherance of a
"proper public purpose"' through the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. What constitutes such a purpose in connection with
redevelopment has been the subject of considerable litigation.
Under early case law, the power of eminent domain was limited
to taking property to facilitate public improvements.7 As national
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
6. Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673
(1959); People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954);
Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
7. Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 556, 178 P. 150
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attention turned to the squalor of American cities, courts began to
accept the rationale that slums were detrimental to the health,
safety, and welfare of the public and that their elimination would
appropriately serve a "proper public purpose." 8 State legislatures,9
with judicial approval,"0 went even further in expanding the concept
of "proper public purpose" to include the clearance of "blighted,"
as well as slum property.
A. Appropriate Purpose
A variety of cases over the past several decades have helped
shape the limits of the "proper public purpose" test as it relates to
the elimination of blight. In Berman v. Parker" the United States
Supreme Court announced the principle that an area of a city rather
than a particular parcel may be deemed "blighted" and, pursuant
to a plan, lots within that area might be condemned for redevelop-
ment purposes. Based on this concept, redevelopment has justified
the taking of vacant land,12 as well as inoffensive structures.13
Flood control is a problem addressed infrequently through the
use of eminent domain, but primarily through the use of the zoning
power. Where proper, employing zoning restrictions rather than
condemning a parcel allows municipalities to avoid expending pub-
lic funds because the private property owner is not compensated for
a taking. However, when flood control zoning involves substantial
interference with private land use, eminent domain becomes the
appropriate tool.
In the past year, the question of the condemnation of private
property to control floods was raised in an urban renewal context.
As exemplified by Monroe Redevelopment Agency v. Faulk,4 con-
demnation of private property to control floods may constitute a
proper public purpose when part of a redevelopment program.
Considering first the statute authorizing the creation of the
Monroe Redevelopment Agency and deciding that the statute did
not expressly vest in the Agency the power to expropriate private
(1918).
8. See cases cited note 6 supra.
9. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, § 91.13 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
10. Cf. People ex reL. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 3 fli. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954).
11. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
12. People ex reL Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 fli. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
13. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 256 F. Supp.
564 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
14. 287 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
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property for flood protection or control purposes, the court held,
nonetheless, that flood control was implied within the purpose of the
Agency's enabling act. According to the court, the Act was designed
to empower the city to use federal funds and programs for the
elimination and redevelopment of slums and blighted areas, and
that property threatened by floods within the Agency's redevelop-
ment area could be included in a redevelopment plan designed to
eliminate blight by condemnation.' 5 Thus, a redevelopment plan
may encompass more than slum clearance if a public purpose, con-
sistent with the enabling act, can be found that will further redevel-
opment of a blighted area. Under this decision, local redevelopment
agencies may enjoy a degree of flexibility in expanding the concept
of public purpose as it is applied to unique local problems.
B. Compliance with Federal Legislation
When federal funds are involved, local condemnation proce-
dures must comply with federal urban renewal regulations, as well
as serving a proper public purpose. In Bethune v. HUD, 11 the owners
of property proposed to be taken by a county for a public park
brought an action alleging that the county had failed to comply with
its contract with HUD and applicable statutory requirements. The
plaintiffs were found to be donee third party beneficiaries of the
contract between HUD and Jackson County, Missouri because of
incorporation of certain federal statutory provisions into the con-
tract'7 and, thus, to have standing to raise issues under it.
Upon a finding that the county had not followed the procedures
required by one of the federal statutes, the court enjoined the con-
demnation of any property in the park site until the requirements
of the statute had been met. The determination in Bethune that the
property owners had standing as third party beneficiaries of a HUD
contract to challenge compliance with the provisions of the contract
may have considerable future significance in the standing area.
IV. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The question of what qualifies as a "blighted" area raises the
important issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review of local
government determinations. The United States Supreme Court
squarely addressed this issue in Berman v. Parker:
15. Id. at 582.
16. 376 F. Supp. 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622-24, 4625(c)(3), 4651-54 (1970).
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URBAN RENEWAL
[W]e do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the
public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . .The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy. . . . If those who govern the District of Colum-
bia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.18
The court further noted:
[I]t is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the
boundary line not to sit in review on the size of a particular
project area. Once the question of the public purpose has
been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken
for the project and the need for a particular tract to com-
plete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legis-
lative branch. 19
Notwithstanding that Berman is primarily precedent for condemna-
tion within the District of Columbia, most states have followed it.
Nevertheless, the matter remains a lively subject of litigation inso-
far as each state sets its own standard of review of administrative
determinations.
As recently as 1974, the appellate courts of three states consid-
ered the issue. First, in Housing Authority v. Nunn," property own-
ers in the Cairo subdivision of Roosevelt City, Alabama brought a
class action to enjoin the Roosevelt Housing Authority from apply-
ing for a Neighborhood Development Program"1 designation from
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and for a $214,000 federal housing grant for the Cairo subdi-
vision. The trial court rejected the Roosevelt City officials' determi-
nation that the Cairo subdivision was a "blighted" area. The Su-
preme Court of Alabama, however, citing Blakenship v. City of
Decatur," held that a finding by an appropriate body under the
urban renewal and redevelopment laws that an area is a slum or
blighted area is legislative in character and must be upheld unless
18. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
19. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
20. 292 Ala. 60, 288 So. 2d 775 (1974).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1469 et seq. (1970).
22. 269 Ala. 670, 115 So. 2d 459 (1959).
1975]
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it is shown that such finding is a result of arbitrary or capricious
action or was induced by fraud or bad faith. Inasmuch as the trial
court had not found that the Authority acted "arbitrarily" or "ca-
priciously," its decision was reversed.
Second, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania faced a sim-
ilar issue in Leo Realty Company v. Redevelopment Authority,2
where the owner of a warehouse that was structurally sound but
located in an area that was deemed blighted because of
"environmental deficiencies," appealed an order dismissing his
objections to the declaration of taking. Like the Supreme Court of
Alabama, the commonwealth court found that the Authority had
not abused its discretion or acted in bad faith. Citing an earlier
Pennsylvania case,24 the court held:
[t]he power of discretion over what areas are to be consid-
ered blighted is solely within the power of the Authority.
The only function of the courts in this matter is to see that
the Authority has not acted in bad faith; to see that the
Authority has not acted arbitrarily. .... 5
A novel problem was introduced, however, in Leo Realty. The
court was presented with the argument that, ipso facto, because the
plaintiff had been relocated by the same authority to the presently
condemned area, the prior relocation tainted the present
condemnation, rendering it arbitrary and an act of bad faith. The
argument was dismissed on the ground that there must be a showing
of some act that was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith indepen-
dent of the Authority's involvement in a prior relocation to property
later condemned.2 1
On the other hand, in the related area of what may be appropri-
ately included in a redevelopment plan, the court in City of Jack-
sonville v. Moman,27 held that the determination of city planners
and sociologists that a neighborhood needed to be eliminated in
order to provide a "cohesive" area compatible with existing installa-
tions was not a valid basis for a taking. The Florida court, unlike
the Pennsylvania and Alabama courts, followed an expanded scope
of review.
The trial court found that the city had failed to carry its "bur-
23. 13 Pa. Commw. 288, 320 A.2d 149 (1974).
24. Crawford v. Redevelopment Authority, 418 Pa. 549, 211 A.2d 866 (1965).
25. 13 Pa. Commw., 288, 291, 320 A.2d 149, 151 (1974).
26. Id. at 292, 320 A.2d at 151-52.
27. 290 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
[Vol. 52:947
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den of proving by competent and substantial evidence that the
property described is needed for the redevelopment of a slum
area." 2 The appeals court upheld this finding, apparently establish-
ing that a Florida court may make a "de novo" review of a blight
determination by a local agency. In so doing, it stated that "the city
may designate an area as a slum, but such designation does not
make it a slum .... ",29 In this particular case, although the city
planners and sociologists decided to eliminate this neighborhood,
the court concluded that this was not a basis for seizing private
property.3 In arriving at its conclusion the court stressed its role as
the guardian of the rights of property owners:
Even in this enlightened era of "big brother knows best,"
the right of an individual to own and acquire property must




Proceedings for condemnation are rarely instituted without
months and years of planning. Once plans are announced, many
more months or years may ensue before the local authority con-
demns a particular parcel. Often the announcement that an urban
renewal plan will affect a landlord's property, making it difficult if
not impossible to get new tenants and causing a general decline of
the neighborhood. Understandably, therefore, a property owner is
concerned with the exact time at which his property is appraised for
condemnation.
Three bases have evolved for relieving property owners of the
injustice they may suffer if the property is valued at a date after the
neighborhood has declined. Two have been created through judicial
adoption and a third, discussed hereafter in connection with
Freeman v. Patterson Redevelopment Agency,32 has been created by
state legislative enactment.
The first court-adopted theory, "de facto taking," was an-
nounced in the leading case of Foster v. City of Detroit. 3 Under this




32. 128 N.J. Super. 144, 320 A.2d 228 (1974).
33. 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), afl'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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theory compensation is awarded as of the date the condemning
authority substantially interferes with the owner's enjoyment of his
property, irrespective of when title was formally acquired by appro-
priate proceedings. The city had encouraged and aggravated the
deterioration of the property by stating that property owners would
receive no compensation for improvements made after the designa-
tion of the area for redevelopment, requiring, inter alia, the signing
of a "Waiver of Claim for Damages" as a condition precedent to
issuing a building permit and completing condemnation of several
blocks in the area. The court stated:
Generally, the term "taking" is construed in its literal
sense, that is, a taking occurs when the verdict is con-
firmed, the deed executed, and the award paid. There are,
however, special situations where the actions of a govern-
mental body are such as to amount to a taking of private
property, regardless of whether-there is an eminent domain
proceeding, and in such situations, compensation is given
for the taking when it occurs. 4
The second court-adopted theory is "condemnation blight."
Under this theory, the date of taking is left unchanged, but the
owner is compensated for the loss in value prior to the actual taking
which can be traced to a grossly premature disclosure of the con-
demnation. 5
The question of diminution in market value was reviewed in
Redevelopment Agency v. Del Camp Investments. 36 In its decision,
the court failed to indicate which of these two theories it had chosen
to follow, although it appeared to adopt the "de facto" taking ap-
proach. The owner of a seven-story hotel building challenged the
time at which his property was valued. Public announcements that
the property would be condemned were made in 1961. Condemna-
tion was commenced in 1969 and the trial started in 1970, the "val-
uation date." The trial court rejected the owner's proof that the long
standing public knowledge of the property's impending condemna-
tion greatly depressed its value. On appeal, the case was remanded
based upon the California Supreme Court holding in Klopping v.
City of Whittier,7 decided while the principal case was pending:
34. Id. at 662.
35. 4 NICHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151 (1973).
36. 36 Cal. App. 3d, 112 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974).
37. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
[Vol. 52:947
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[A] condemnee must be provided with an opportunity to
demonstrate that (1) the public authority acted improperly
either by unreasonably delaying eminent domain action fol-
lowing an announcement of intent to condemn or by other
unreasonable conduct prior to condemnation; and (2) as a
result of such action the property in question suffered a
diminution in market value."
Reinforcing Kopping, the court of appeals required that evi-
dence of value at the time of the announcement be admitted but,
similar to the Klopping court, it failed to indicate in which direction
California was proceeding in relation to these two theories. Califor-
nia is representative of a growing number of states following an
expanded valuation approach without adopting a specific theory.
B. Inverse Condemnation
Before Foster v. City of Detroit,9 two distinct types of condem-
nation actions were recognized. The most common was the eminent
domain proceeding, a declaration by a governmental body that it
intended to take private property for a public purpose followed by
a formally initiated judicial proceeding.
The other cause of action was inverse condemnation. When a
governmental body has taken or damaged private property, the
owner could initiate an action against the governmental defendant
to recover the value of the property taken, even though there was
no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain."
Usually, a property owner is entitled to the fair market value
of his property at the time of the taking, normally deemed to be the
time when the government brings its action. This formula, however,
does not adequately compensate him in cases where the announce-
ment of a redevelopment plan results in the decline of property
values before the eminent domain proceeding is commenced. In
order to provide redress, courts went a step further and began to
apply actual taking rationales to the area of valuation. For example,
the court in Foster used the principles of inverse condemnation in
valuation cases to create the "de facto" taking theory. Unwittingly,
the courts provided a fertile field for imaginative legal minds to
stretch the concept of inverse condemnation itself.
38. Id. at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
39. 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), affd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
40. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180 n.1, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (1962).
1975]
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In Freeman v. Redevelopment Agency,4' the New Jersey court
faced this issue. The plaintiff-property owner, on the basis of facts
that would clearly establish a "de facto" taking for valuation pur-
poses, asked the court to declare that his property had actually been
taken by inverse condemnation. He sought the immediate assess-
ment of his property or immediate condemnation. 2
The court examined both the "de facto" taking and "condem-
nation blight" theories, adopting the latter approach.43 At the out-
set, the court discussed the hybrid legislative approach of those
states whose constitutional provisions were so enlarged to require
just compensation where private property was either taken or
damaged." The New Jersey constitutional provision was limited to
the taking situation. The court concluded that under the New Jer-
sey Constitution the facts relied upon to establish a constructive
taking in Freeman "would be appropriate to establish the quantum
of damages after initiation of condemnation, but do not justify the
compelling of the condemnation itself."4 There was no "taking"
because the plaintiff was not deprived of all beneficial use of his
property for an indeterminate time.
Although the concept of compensating a property owner for loss
due to the announcement that his property is within a blighted area
is now generally accepted, Freeman demonstrates the continued
reluctance of courts to find an actual condemnation prior to the
commencement of eminent domain proceedings. The court has at-
tempted to balance the detriment to the municipality including the
cost of condemning and acquiring the property, managing or demol-
ishing structures on the property, and the loss of tax revenues
against the owner's losses prior to condemnation, due to the decline
in income and value of his property. Unfortunately, in most states
there are no statutes, like New Jersey's, which compel the munici-
pality to acquire all the property in an area designated as
"blighted." Perhaps the best solution in this situation is to allow
partial compensation for damage to the owner's property as pro-
vided by statute in some states."
41. 128 N.J. Super. 148, 320 A.2d 228 (1974).
42. Id. at 453, 320 A.2d at 230-31.
43. Id. at 453-54, 320 A.2d at 231.
44. 7 NICHoLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.02(5) (1973).
45. 128 N.J. Super. at 456, 320 A.2d at 232.
46. 7 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.02(5) (1973).
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The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered the
question of de facto condemnation from a different perspective in
Berman v. Urban Redevelopment Authority.47 In Berman the appel-
lant was a scrap metal processor. Appellant carried on his business,
a single integrated operation, on five contiguous parcels, one of
which was leased from Sanford Steel Products Company. Pursuant
to an urban renewal plan, the Authority filed a declaration of tak-
ing, condemning the Sanford Steel parcel. Berman received an
award for his interest in this parcel.
Deeming his leasehold interest in the four adjoining properties
useless, the appellant terminated his leases, vacated the properties,
and was reimbursed.
Berman then brought this action contending the condemnation
of the Sanford Steel parcel, leased and used in an integrated eco-
nomic operation with supporting parcels, necessarily caused a de
facto injury or destruction of his leasehold interests in the support-
ing properties. The court held that Berman was compensated in the
prior condemnation proceeding and that the taking of the plant
property was not a de facto taking of the supporting properties since
it did not deprive him of the use or enjoyment of such properties."
In these two 1974 cases, the courts faced an attempt to expand
the scope of the de facto taking valuation theory. After cases like
In re Elmwood Park49 and Foster v. City of Detroit" where the doc-
trine of a constructive taking was liberally construed to provide
owners with a more accurate and just compensation for loss due to
the early announcement that their property was in an urban renewal
area, the courts have been required to carefully scrutinize a new
series of challenges. Based on the de facto taking theory, the new
challenges seek an early declaration condemnation, pursuant to an
inverse taking rationale. Perhaps, as Freeman and Berman indicate,
the courts will rely on the argument that the owner has not been
deprived of all beneficial use and enjoyment for an indeterminate
period to avoid a declaration of an unintended taking by a munici-
pality under the inverse condemnation theory.
47. 15 Pa. Cmwlth. 1, 324 A.2d 811 (1974).
48. Id. at 4, 324 A.2d at 813.
49. 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965).
50. 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
1975]
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C. Damages
Normally, a property owner's recovery is limited to just com-
pensation with respect to the reduced value of his property interest.
The issue of consequential damages is, as yet, an uncharted area.
In Parish of Jefferson v. Gonzales"' the court of appeals of Louisiana
faced the novel question of whether a property owner's disability
benefits under a mortgage insurance policy could be included as
part of the owner's damages. There, the Mirons purchased property
subject to a mortgage and were issued a form of mortgage insurance
in favor of and payable to the mortgage holder. The policy provided,
inter alia, that Miron would be paid a monthly sum for a period not
to exceed 60 months in the event he became disabled. Under this
policy payments would terminate before the end of the 60-month
period upon prepayment of the mortgage. After judgment was ren-
dered transferring title to the Parish, the mortgage was prepaid and
the benefits discontinued. The court reviewed the rule that a "prop-
erty owner is entitled to recover actual damages directly attributa-
ble to the expropriation," but that "[a]nticipated, remote or spec-
ulative damages are not recoverable,"52 and found that Miron's right
to 60 monthly benefit payments became vested when he became
disabled. On this basis it held that he was entitled to compensation
for the loss of these benefits, but compensable damages were limited
to out-of-pocket loss caused by the premature termination of
monthly benefits. This loss was determined to be only that portion
of the monthly payment which would have been applied by the
mortgage company to reduce the principal balance. The court held
that funds apportioned to interest, taxes, and insurance were main-
tenance expenses from which the defendant was relieved by the
taking.
The court, however, failed to appreciate the nature of the insur-
ance policy which guaranteed continued mortgage payments during
Miron's disability. The insurance was designed to protect him from
a default on the mortgage and loss of his home due to his disability.
The insurance provided for full mortgage payments, including
interest, taxes, and insurance. The policy premium, paid as part of
the monthly mortgage payment, was based on the amount required
to pay principal, interest, taxes, and insurance. By prepaying the
mortgage, the Parish forced him to lose these insurance benefits. If,
51. 288 So. 2d 65 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
52. Id. at 66.
[Vol. 52:947
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as the court states, the property owner is entitled to recover actual
damages directly attributable to the expropriation, then the Mirons
should have been compensated for the fair market value of their
home and all benefits lost as a result of the prepayment of the
mortgage. Compensation for the loss of equity- which would eventu-
ally accrue through insurance benefits does not compensate for in-
terest, taxes, and insurance premiums, which the insurance com-
pany was obligated to pay. These benefits were lost due to the
expropriation though Miron remained disabled. Using the cash re-
ceived to purchase a new home would not reinstate these benefits.
Thus, Miron was not fully compensated for the actual damage at-
tributable to the expropriation.
VI. RELOCATION ASSISTANCE
Few aspects of the urban renewal program have created as
much controversy as relocation. In respect to both the Urban Re-
newal Program and the Community Development Block Grant Pro-
gram, the federal relocation statute requires, as a condition to re-
ceiving federal grants and loans, that there be a feasible method for
the temporary relocation of individuals and families displaced from
a "blighted" area as a result of condemnation. Each local agency
must establish a relocation assistance program for each urban re-
newal project.53 Before displacing any residents of the project area,
the local agency must provide assurances to HUD that relocation
housing is available. 4 The statute also provides for direct payments
to individuals, families, business concerns, and nonprofit organiza-
tions displaced because of urban renewal acquisition, code enforce-
ment, or voluntary rehabilitation activities."
Two cases considered relocation issues. In Parish of Jefferson
v. Gonzales,5" after considering the just compensation issue, the
court discussed a relocation problem. The Parish received a federal
loan in 1965 to make a feasibility study of the proposed public
improvement. The Mirons claimed that they were entitled to reloca-
tion assistance as a result of the taking of their home for an urban
renewal project, but the court held that they were not entitled to
such assistance under federal law.5" The statute required state and
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (1970).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (1970).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(a) (1970).
56. 288 So. 2d 65 (La. Ct. App. 1974). Discussed p. 958 supra.
57. Id. at 68
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local agencies undertaking public projects with federal financial
assistance, including federal loans, to provide relocation assistance
to displaced persons whose property was expropriated. Because the
loan was granted before the relocation statute was enacted, the
court took the position that the Parish was not required to provide
relocation assistance for the project unless new federal funds were
required. It felt that requiring the Parish to provide relocation assis-
tance would be ex post facto impairment of the obligations under
the original contract with HUD."
In King Athletic Goods Company v. Redevelopment Author-
ity, 9 two sporting goods companies alleged that the Redevelopment
Authority had filed a declaration of taking but was delaying reloca-
tion by refusing to approve one of their moving bids. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Code expressly limited the amount the owner of a condemned prop-
erty could receive to cover the costs of moving machinery, equip-
ment, and fixtures from a condemned site to a new location to
$25,000 and, that as a matter of law, the companies could not exceed
this amount." A written agreement to move between the companies
and the Redevelopment Authority, provided that "the 'moving ex-
penses' . . . and the expenses of disconnection, removal and rein-
stallation of King's machinery, equipment, and fixtures were to be
processed the same as if both were 'regular and ordinary moving
costs.' ",61
The Authority accepted one of three bids and authorized the
move by letter 2 on May 15, 1969. This company moved most of
King's equipment by June 4, 1969. King then submitted bids to the
Authority for the cost of moving the remaining machinery and
equipment. The Authority made general objections and failed to
select a bid. After other bids were submitted, the Authority still
delayed the selection, so King filed suit in equity requesting that the
Authority be compelled to comply with the agreement. King sought
damages totalling $245,000, including relocation costs and the
amount lost in its business operations. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that the language of the agreement between King and
the Authority brought it within the Eminent Domain Code, which
58. Id.
59. 457 Pa. 17, 323 A.2d 727 (1974).
60. Id. at 21, 323 A.2d at 730.




limited King's recovery for relocation to $25,000.
VII. NEPA AND URBAN RENEWAL
Two cases in 1974 discussed the application of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)63 to urban renewal programs.
Both held the Act applicable to activities undertaken as part of a
federal urban renewal program, but only one found that the Act's
requirements had not been met.
In Wilson v. Lynn 4 residents of the Boston South End Renewal
Plan Area brought an action against HUD officials to restrain fur-
ther activity on a project to rehabilitate 36 buildings within the area
to produce 185 dwelling units, claiming that the filing of an environ-
mental impact statement was required by the NEPA. 5 The Act
requires such a statement as a prerequisite to any major federal
action significantly affecting the human environment.66
All parties agreed that the mortgage insurance undertaken by
HUD and its guarantee of interest payments to the developer consti-
tuted "major federal action." Defendants contended there was no
discretionary action left to HUD that could be influenced by the
existence of an environmental impact statement.
The court found that the Commitment for Insurance of Ad-
vances, which HUD entered into December 28, 1973, became irrev-
ocable on January 31, 1974 with the execution of the first certificate
of mortgage insurance. HUD, however, reviews each application for
a new mortgage insurance certificate covering each additional ad-
vance under the construction loan agreement. The purpose of this
review is to determine whether all construction is in accordance with
applicable rules, regulations, and specifications. Although HUD
may not be authorized to require any changes in the design of the
project to correct environmental deficiencies, HUD can withhold
mortgage insurance because of such deficiencies, thus delaying fur-
ther mortgage loan advances and project completion pending com-
pliance.
The court cited Jones v. Lynn 7 as requiring the district court
to use "imagination and flexibility" in these situations. In carrying
out this directive the court first considered whether federal action
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
64. 372 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1974).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
66. Id.
67. 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
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significantly affected the quality of the human environment. 8 The
court held that while the environmental situation in the South End
was far from ideal, there was no evidence the Project would cause
"adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing
uses in the area affected by it."9 The court further noted:
Under its own regulations, HUD is prohibited without
first filing an Environmental Impact Statement from insur-
ing the financing of residential construction in areas where
the existing environment does not meet certain minimum
standards."0
Under guidelines established by the Council on Environmental
Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, when an envi-
ronmental review indicates no significant impact a negative decla-
ration shall be prepared prior to taking action.7' The court further
held these requirements were met when HUD prepared a Special
Environmental Clearance. 72 Thus, plaintiffs applications for pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions were denied.
The court followed and strengthened the precedent of Jones
v. Lynn73 stating that although HUD had become irrevocably com-
mitted to insure certain mortgage advances, it still had discretion
to withhold insurance for each advance if environmental factors
that might jeopardize the safety and health of the eventual tenants
of the rehabilitated structure came to HUD's attention. Conse-
quently, the requirements of the Act applied to a development pro-
ject even after the commitment stage and before each advance.
Clearly this holding extended NEPA to a greater number of activi-
ties and increased its influence over real estate developments in
which HUD was involved.
In Jones v. Redevelopment Land Agency, 74 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered two impor-
tant and novel questions regarding the application of the NEPA.
First, the court considered whether the NEPA required the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Agency (RLA) to include an environ-
68. 372 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Maas. 1974).
69. Id. at 937, quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. 372 F. Supp. at 937.
71. 40 C.F.R. § 6.25(A) (1973).
72. A Special Environmental Clearance is required by HUD guidelines as described in
HUD Circular 1390.1.
73. 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
74. 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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mental impact statement in each proposed action year program for
the Neighborhood Development Program at the outset of the agency
review and approval process. The environmental impact statement
was to "accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
process."75
After consultation with area residents and other interested par-
ties, the RLA formulates the action year program, the steps to be
taken during the year in conformity with the overall program for
community development previously certified by HUD. The Agency
then submits its proposed action year program to a planning com-
mission for adoption or modification. If the planning commission
adopts the program, either as submitted or as modified, it is pre-
sented to the District of Columbia City Council, which holds public
hearings on it and decides whether to empower the RLA to apply
to HUD for federal funding. If the Council approves the program,
the planning commission certifies it to the RLA for implementation,
the District applies to HUD for funding, and the RLA proceeds to
execute the provisions of the program.
Most of the cases that have considered the timing of impact
statements have dealt with the process of decisionmaking within a
single agency. The principles these cases have formulated are also
applicable to decisionmaking accomplished by several agencies act-
ing seriatim. The original submission by the RLA is a distinctive
and comprehensive stage of the process, that is, it is itself a proposal
for federal action requiring an environmental impact statement.
The RLA argued that to require it to submit an environmental
impact statement to the planning commission together with its ac-
tion year plan would be inefficient, since the planning commission
could well modify the plan and thus render the RLA's impact state-
ment an anachronism. Environmental impact statements were
not meant to be merely post hoc environmental rationalizations of
decisions already fully and finally made. Rather, their purpose was
to insure meaningful consideration of environmental factors at all
stages of agency decisionmaking and to inform both the public and
agencies involved at subsequent stages of decisionmaking of the
environmental cost of the proposal. Accordingly, it is precisely be-
cause the planning commission has the power to modify the RLA's
action year proposals that impact statements accompanying the
proposals are necessary. The planning commission may be vitally
75. 42 U.S.C. § 43 et seq. (1970).
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affected by the information contained in and the conclusions drawn
in the RLA's impact statements, when considering approval or mod-
ifications of the proposals. Equally important, the public will be
afforded an opportunity, prior to the planning commission's deci-
sion, to inform the commission of views contrary to those submitted
by the RLA. This will insure that the commission's decision and its
own environmental statement will be premised on complete infor-
mation about the project and that environmental factors will be
taken into account before the action year plans take on the irreversi-
ble momentum of planning commission approval. Therefore, to
meet the requirements of the NEPA, both the RLA and the plan-
ning commission must include impact statements in their proposed
action year programs, and HUD must prepare and issue final state-
ments when the programs are finally approved.
Because the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
has eliminated the Neighborhood Development Program,76 this case
has limited precedential value. The principle announced here may
be applied in other cases, however, where municipal agencies for-
mally assist the local government body in the preparation of appli-
cations for Community Development Block Grants. 77
The court of appeals also considered whether the failure of the
agency to file a timely environmental impact statement warranted
an injunction. The lower court had found that there was an absence
of imminent, irreparable harm flowing from the failure to comply
with NEPA.
The appellate court found that the district court had defined
too narrowly the kind of harm which, under NEPA, may be suffi-
cient to warrant a preliminary injunction. NEPA was intended to
insure that federal action was taken only after responsible decision-
makers fully considered the environmental consequences and de-
cided that public benefits outweighed environmental costs. Accord-
ingly, the problem with which courts must be concerned in NEPA
cases is not harm to the environment, per se, but rather the harm
resulting from the agency's failure to file environmental impact
statements so environmental factors can be considered as required
by NEPA.
But, because final environmental impact statements had been
filed, the district court refused to enjoin further action concluding
that there was substantial compliance with NEPA. The court of
appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1469 et seq. (1970).




Related to the concept of redeveloping and preserving inner-
city neighborhoods are issues related to controlling urban growth,
particularly the outward expansion of an urban area. In many of our
oldest metropolitan areas, the inner cities stand as abandoned shells
while new developments expand ever rapidly outward from the cen-
tral city, creating real questions concerning the efficient use of re-
sources. If outward expansion can be restricted and developed under
a more rational plan, there may be greater opportunity for redevel-
opment of central cities.
In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City
of Petaluma,71 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California reviewed a small city's plan for limiting growth
and held it unconstitutional. The Construction Industry Association
brought the action against the City, challenging the constitution-
ality of the City's plan to limit growth by creating an "urban exten-
sion line" and a 500-unit annual limitation on new housing permits.
The court held the plan was a violation of the right to travel, not
supported by any compelling governmental interest that could not
be served by alternatives.
Initially, at least, techniques to control growth in urban areas
are running into judicial resistance. Perhaps, more aggravated in-
stances of urban sprawl and broader arguments directed to more
efficient use of valuable and depleting resources are necessary before
approaches, such as those used in Petaluma, will find their place as
acceptable land use tools.
IX. CONCLUSION
This past year was not a particularly significant one for urban
renewal case law development. Most importantly, the federal cate-
gorical urban renewal program created in 1949 was replaced by the
Community Development Block Grant Program, Title I of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974./
Several leading cases reinforced the judicial scope of review test
with respect to local urban renewal determinations enunciated in
Berman v. Parker: a local agency's actions will be overturned only
if it has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.A0
78. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
80. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1974).
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The issue of early taking continued to be lively. Litigants are
pressing the issue beyond the principle of using an early valuation
date in establishing just compensation under a condemnation pro-
ceeding. An effort has emerged to influence the courts to "compel"
a taking based upon the rationale of inverse condemnation, when
property values and profits in a designated urban renewal area are
adversely affected by the project prior to the start of condemnation.
Lastly, it would appear that attempts to control urban growth
by limiting housing unit production and, thereby controlling popu-
lation expansion, will initially experience judicial resistance on con-
stitutional, as well as philosophical grounds. The battle lines in this
area, however, have just begun to be drawn.
